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ABSTRACT
It is necessary to verify the faults tolerance of the Euro-
pean Train Control System (ETCS) on-board unit even if these 
faults are uncommon. Traditional test methods defined and 
used in ETCS do not allow to check this, so it is necessary 
to develop a new mechanism of tests. This paper presents 
the design and implementation of a saboteur applied to the 
railway sector. The main purpose of the saboteur is the fault 
injection in the communication interfaces. By means of a 
virtual laboratory it is possible to simulate actual train jour-
neys to test the ETCS on-board unit. Making use of the sab-
oteurs and the virtual laboratory it is possible to analyse the 
behaviour of the train in the presence of unexpected faults, 
and to verify that the decisions taken are correct to ensure 
the required safety level. Therefore, this work shows a test-
ing strategy based on different kinds of train journeys when 
faults are injected, and the analysis of the results.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Currently, all the railway signalling systems man-
ufacturers have to be compatible with the European 
Train Control System (ETCS), i.e. the development of 
any railway product has to meet the standards and 
tests specified by ETCS. All the devices designed fol-
lowing the ETCS norms must be safety critical, which 
means that errors must not occur and they must be 
fault tolerant. To achieve this, standards like EN-50129 
[1] should be used. This norm specifies that safety 
testing is required, but there is no technical specifica-
tion in the standards on how to implement these tests. 
Moreover, the ETCS standards SUBSET-076 [2] and 
SUBSET-094 [3] that are used as reference to imple-
ment the tests of the ETCS On-Board Unit (OBU) do not 
list any safety testing. 
With the aim of accomplishing safety testing, fault 
injection techniques can be employed. Currently, the 
behaviour of the train modules in the presence of 
faults is not tested according to ETCS standards. In 
real operation when an unexpected fault appears, the 
system faces a non-tested situation. This is why the 
systems should be tested in worse case scenarios in-
cluding faults. 
Therefore, to test the modules including safety as-
sessment according to EN-50129 [1] it is necessary 
to inject faults in the inputs of different modules. For 
the case of the ETCS OBU it is possible to simulate 
that wrong information is received due to different 
factors that could be the missing of a balise, wrong 
speed information, wrong balise position, etc. This al-
lows testing of the train in the presence of unexpect-
ed faults and observing the behaviour of the on-board 
computer. Therefore, fault injection techniques can be 
employed by means of saboteurs in communications 
between physically independent parts.
This paper is structured as follows: Firstly, the state 
of the art describes ETCS and the fault injection tech-
niques. Afterwards, the fault list that might cause a 
core hazard and type of voters are detailed. The next 
sections deal with the features of the virtual laboratory 
used to carry out the test. Then, in the fifth section, 
the implementation of the saboteurs is described. The 
following section shows the strategy of performing the 
tests. The seventh section deals with the results of the 
carried out tests. And finally, the conclusions of the re-
search work are presented.
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2. STATE OF THE ART
The state of the art is divided in two subsections: 
firstly, the descriptions of the European Rail Traffic 
Management System (ERTMS) and ETCS are present-
ed, and later the fault injection techniques are de-
tailed.
2.1 ERTMS
One of the main components of ERTMS is the 
ETCS. It was designed to replace different national 
safety systems used in railway that are incompatible 
among them. This allows to have the same signalling 
and control system along multiple countries regard-
less of the train manufacturer [4]. ETCS is specified at 
four different levels [5]:
Level 0: there is no communication between the train 
and the track; the driver needs to observe the track 
signals.
Level 1: the communication between the train and the 
track is via ETCS balises. It allows communication up 
to 300 km/h.
Level 2: ETCS data transmission is continuous by 
means of wireless communications.
Level 3: similar to level 2 but with on-board positioning 
and train integrity allowing the moving block technol-
ogy.
On the other hand, ETCS is divided into two parts 
[6]:
 – ETCS on-board equipment: composed of an EVC 
(European Vital Computer) computer and its pe-
ripherals.
 – ETCS trackside equipment: this always includes 
balises. It can also include Radio Block Centres 
(RBC), Euroloops and Radio In-fill Units.
The on-board equipment is safety critical and ac-
cording to the specifications SUBSET-091 [7] and 
SUBSET-088 [10] it must has a Tolerable Hazard Rate 
(THR) less than 10-9 F/h, or in others words, it is al-
lowed to have maximum one fault every 109 hours. For 
each function on the train a THR is assigned to identify 
how it contributes to the core hazard. This is described 
in SUBSET-091 [7]. Therefore, in order to reach this 
THR the on-board system should be designed against 
failures. 
However, when it comes to testing and assessing 
the safety level, the ERTMS normative does not men-
tion how to test this capability. Previous European proj-
ects such as EMSET [8] and INESS [9] only defined 
functional testing as the ETCS norms SUBSET-076 [2] 
and SUBSET-094 [3]. For trackside equipment norms 
like SUBSET-085 [11] for balises and SUBSET-103 
[12] for Euroloop describe the tests needed to approve 
these devices, but again these standards only address 
functional tests. However, the normative for safety 
critical systems, such as ETCS, EN-50129 [1] for rail-
ways and EN-61508 [13] generic, specify that fault 
injection is required to ensure safety in any electronic 
device used in safety critical devices like railway. 
2.2 Fault injection techniques
Fault Injection Techniques (FIT) are considered as 
a very useful approach to evaluate the dependability of 
a system, and also to reduce costs of field testing [14, 
15]. Different FIT types include:
 – Hardware-based techniques: this technique allows 
testing of the circuit resistance against external el-
ements, for example, electromagnetic waves, radi-
ation or signals injected in the I/O pins. An advan-
tage of this technique is that it is possible to test 
real environment conditions. On the other hand, a 
disadvantage is that expensive external hardware 
is required [16].
 – Software-based techniques: it is only necessary to 
change the source code to inject a fault in the de-
vice under test, compile the software and run it to 
see the behaviour of the device. An advantage of 
this technique is that it is low complexity and cost. 
A disadvantage is that it is not possible to test all 
used cases [17, 18].
 – Emulation-based techniques: with the emergence 
of the hardware description languages this tech-
nique became popular. The main advantage is that 
it allows testing of complex circuits with a better 
performance than simulation, and hence the devel-
opment time can be reduced. On the other hand, 
a disadvantage is the additional hardware to emu-
late, which can be very expensive [19].
 – Simulation-based techniques: the device under 
test is modelled in a simulation tool to test it in dif-
ferent situations. An advantage is the possibility to 
test the system in any step of the development pro-
cess or even when it is already implemented. The 
main drawback is the complexity of certain scenar-
ios; sometimes it is not possible to simulate all the 
cases [20].
 – Hybrid techniques: combining two or more of the 
above ones [21].
When fault injection is performed during the exe-
cution of a simulation, an external device to introduce 
the fault is required. This device is usually called sab-
oteur. Using saboteurs allows testing of a system or 
device in a non-invasive way, i.e. no changes on the 
software or hardware are needed.
3. FAULT LIST AND TYPES OF SABOTEURS
The saboteur is a device that performs the fault in-
jection. This section details the faults that can cause 
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a core hazard on trains. For each fault, the on-board 
module involved is detected. Then, it is possible to de-
fine all the saboteurs required to simulate the faults. 
Also an overview of the saboteur's functionality is pre-
sented.
3.1 Fault list
A dangerous failure for the ETCS on-board equip-
ment is defined as: “failure to provide on-board su-
pervision and protection according to the information 
provided to the ETCS on-board from external entities” 
[7], and only failures that lead to the ETCS Core Haz-
ard (exceeding the safe speed or distance information 
provided to ETCS) need to be considered.
Table 1 shows a list of the events that might cause 
an ETCS Core Hazard, either alone or in combination 
with other failures. Additionally, it contains a descrip-
tion of each fault and the on-board element that is in-
volved [7]. There were 27 different events that were 
identified. Each of these events has to be tested to 
verify the safety capabilities of the OBU.
3.2 Type of saboteurs
Table 1 shows that five on-board elements can cause 
the core hazard, hence one saboteur per element 
should be implemented to test all the events. The list 
of the saboteurs includes: BTM, LTM, ODO, TIU and 
DMI.
The saboteur is connected in the communications 
interface of two devices, and its objective is to alter 
the information of the messages. This is why this kind 
of devices is also called interface saboteurs [22, 23]. 
When the saboteur is not injecting faults it acts as 
a bridge between the two devices, i.e. the communica-
tion is not altered, so the devices can send messages 
between them without any problem. Figure 1 shows 
the communication between two devices when an 
interface saboteur is connected and injects a fault to 
Table 1 – Faults list that might cause an ETCS Core Hazard
Event Id Event Description On-board module
MMI-1a False acknowledgment of mode change from full supervision Driver Machine Interface [DMI]
MMI-1b False command to enter non-leading mode DMI
MMI-1c False command of override End of Authority (EoA) request DMI
MMI-1d False acknowledgment of level transition DMI
MMI-1e False acknowledgment of train trip DMI
MMI-1f False acknowledgment of track ahead free DMI
MMI-2a False presentation of speed or distance on the DMI DMI
MMI-2b False presentation of mode on the DMI DMI
MMI-3 Falsification of driver’s train data input DMI
MMI-4 Frozen or delayed DMI display DMI
ODO-1 Incorrect standstill indication Odometer (ODO)
ODO-2 Speed measurement underestimates trains actual speed ODO
ODO-3 Incorrect actual physical speed direction ODO
ODO-4 Distance measurement is incorrect ODO
TI-1 Service brake/emergency brake not commanded when required Train Interface Unit (TIU)
TI-2 Service brake/emergency brake release commanded when not required TIU
TI-3 Inappropriate sleeping request TIU
TI-4 Incorrect brake status (TIU failure) TIU
TI-5 Incorrect direction controller position report (TIU failure) TIU
TI-6a Loss of cabin active signal TIU
TI-6b Wrong cabin considered as Active TIU
BTM-H1 A balise group is not detected, due to failure at the on-board Balise Trans-mission Module (BTM) function BTM
BTM-H4 Transmission of an erroneous telegram, interpretable as correct BTM
BTM-H7 Erroneous localization of a balise Group, with reception of valid telegrams BTM
BTM-H8 The order of reported balises, with reception of valid telegrams BTM
BTM-H9 Erroneous reporting of a balise group in a different track, with reception of valid telegrams BTM
LTM-H4 Transmission of an erroneous telegram, interpretable as correct Loop Transmission Module (LTM)
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a message sent from Device A to Device B. The sab-
oteurs operate as follows: firstly, the saboteur inter-
cepts the message, while the Device A (device which 
sent the message) is waiting for a confirmation of 
reception. The saboteur responds with the expected 
message to Device A. After that, the saboteur alters 
the message information and sends it to Device B.





Figure 1 – Saboteur actions between devices
4. VIRTUAL LABORATORY
This section describes the virtual laboratory used 
to perform the tests. Firstly, the architecture of the lab-
oratory including the saboteurs is detailed. Then, an 
explanation of all the applications that make up the 
virtual laboratory is presented. And finally, the steps 
required to perform a simulation and the messages 
format are described.
4.1 Virtual laboratory architecture
A virtual laboratory is a platform where physical 
equipment is replaced with computational models, 
in the field of railway, current tools simulate the be-
haviour of the telecommunication and control systems 
[24, 25]. The virtual lab presented in the project “ETCS 
Advanced Testing and Smart Train Positioning System” 
(EATS) [26], allows simulation of the train OBU during a 
trip, and thanks to the saboteurs it is possible to inject 
faults that would not occur otherwise during normal 
operation. With this the behaviour of the OBU under 
unexpected conditions can be analysed.
Figure 2 shows the on-board ERTMS testing labo-
ratory architecture described in [3] but the interface 
saboteurs are added. The virtual lab follows this archi-
tecture, simulating all the elements.
4.2 Virtual laboratory applications
The virtual laboratory has five applications that al-
low the simulation of a journey [26]:
 – Even feeder: this application reads an XML file 

























































Figure 2 – ETCS on-board simulation lab [26]
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HEADER
eventType time length
1 byte 8 bytes 2 bytes
Balise event
HEADER event_time nid_big n_pig t_report seq bytes
11 bytes 8 bytes 4 bytes 4 bytes 8 bytes 4 bytes n bytes
EuroLoop Event
HEADER event_time seq bytes
11 bytes 8 bytes 4 bytes n bytes
Odometry Event
HEADER event_time speed position acceleration seq
11 bytes 8 bytes 8 bytes 8 bytes 8 bytes 4 bytes
Figure 3 – Message format for odometer, balise and Euroloop events in the virtual lab
corresponding element. The XML files are created 
with information taken from the real train trips and 
they contain odometer, balise, Euroloop, train inter-
face and euro radio events.
 – Juridical Recording Unit (JRU) application: it cre-
ates an XML file when the simulation ends with all 
the trip information.
 – Controller: this application configures and starts all 
the other elements.
 – ETCS kernel: the kernel consists of two applica-
tions, the EVC and the ERTMS Formal Specs (EFS) 
[27]. The EVC receives all the information or mes-
sages from all the other lab elements (odometer, 
balise, Euroloop, etc.). On the other hand, when all 
the events are received the EFS simulates the train 
journey.
 – Driver Machine Interface (DMI): this application 
simulates the driver's interface of a real train.
4.3 Virtual laboratory simulation
The virtual laboratory uses a custom messages for-
mat for each interface. Figure 3 shows the format for 
the odometer, balise and Euroloop events. This means 
that the journey events (XML file) are converted to this 
format and they are sent to the other elements by the 
event feeder. 
To simulate a journey in the virtual laboratory the 
next steps are performed:
1) All the applications must be configured with the 
controller.
2) Choose journey to simulate.
3) The event feeder sends the events to the corre-
sponding elements (BTM, LTM, etc.).
4)  All the elements (BTM, LTM, etc.) process the mes-
sages received from the event feeder and they 
send the new messages to the EVC.
5) The EVC receives the messages from all the ele-
ments and saves them.
6) When all the events are received the EVC sends the 
events to the EFS and the simulation starts.
7)  The DMI receives information from the EFS to show 
it.
8) When the simulation ends a JRU file is created with 
the simulation information.
5. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SABOTEURS
The next subsections describe how the saboteurs 
are implemented and the process to detect the net-
work packages in order to be able to inject the faults 
defined in Table 1.
5.1 Features of the interface saboteur
Interface saboteurs for virtual lab test bench are 
implemented through a commercial Linux board. The 
decision of choosing a Linux board is based on the 
features that this operating system (OS) offers, which 
enables the use of all routing characteristics like IP-ta-
bles. 
The saboteur’s features are explained below:
 – Database: each saboteur contains a database 
with the information of the actions that can be per-
formed.
 – Listening controller: this software applies all the 
IP-tables rules in order to redirect the messages to 
the saboteur. 
 – Actuator: this application receives the redirected 
messages and performs the sabotage based on 
the information stored in the database.
Figure 4 shows a configuration and running soft-
ware execution order for interface saboteurs. First the 
external controller configures the database and makes 
a TCP/IP connection with the listening controller. Af-
ter that, the listening controller interprets filtering in-
formation from database and applies IP-tables. Final-
ly, the listening controller runs as many actuators at 
proper ports based on the filtering rules as specified 
in the database. 
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5.2 Saboteur actions
This section describes the process of how the net-
work messages are sabotaged. To achieve this, the 
saboteurs must be configured, they must capture the 
network traffic and modify the information at the com-
munication protocol layer. 
The listening controller receives all the TCP mes-
sages and when one message matches the filter crite-
ria it is sent to the actuator. On the other hand, if the 
packet does not match the criteria the saboteur acts 
as a bridge and the message is sent to the original 
end-point. The filter criteria are stored in the database 
and are based on these parameters: source IP, desti-
nation IP, source port, destination port and event type 
(this is inside the packet payload, see Figure 3).
At this point, the actuator at the interface saboteur 
elaborates a reply to the source IP / source Port of 
the redirected packet, since communication protocol 
(TCP/IP) defines an echo response of the end device 
for each packet received containing data. The inter-
face saboteur does not need to spoof any IP or MAC 
address since the sending or replying IP or MAC ad-
dress has no impact on the logic functionality of the 
lab testbed software.
Table 2 – Fault chains related to faults defined for BTM 
module
Module Fault Chain id Fault function
BTM
BTM-H1 IS-1 Suppression
BTM-H4 IS-2 Bytes random
BTM-H8 IS-4 Flip
BTM-H9 IS-5 Creation
When the response is sent it is time to perform the 
sabotage. To do this it is necessary to get the informa-
tion from the database. The database has two main ta-
bles: the first one has the information about all faults 
that can be injected and the other table has the time 
in which each fault is injected. Table 2 shows the infor-
mation about BTM faults. The “Chain id” indicates the 
table name that contains the information about the 
times to inject the faults. 
Table 3 illustrates an example of the information 
stored in IS-2 which relates to BTM-H4 “transmission 
of an erroneous telegram, interpretable as correct”. 
The time at which the fault is injected is random, but it 
has to be within two ranges (t_on and t_off).
Table 3 – Example of four fault windows for IS-2 fault chain
id t_on t_off Offset nbytes Res
0 300.56 300.58 45 45 NOT
1 301.66 302 45 45 NOT
2 400.98 401 45 45 NOT
Once fault information is inserted into the packet, 
it has to be sent to the original communication end-
point. For this purpose, the saboteur establishes a 
TCP/IP connection with the original communication. 
The saboteur acts in the same way as the original com-
munication, which means that TCP/IP connection from 
the saboteur with the end-point only is made when the 
original starting-point is establishing the connection, 
and it is released when the original starting-point re-
leases the connection.
6. TEST STRATEGY
This section shows the test strategy designed in or-
der to detect the faults with more impact in the system 
behaviour.
The main objective of the test strategy is to detect 
the worst case scenarios for the system; therefore, the 
test was performed following this plan of action:
1) A reference journey is simulated with each fault de-
fined in Table 1 (Section 3.1), which means that 27 
tests are performed.
2) The faults are applied in the following way: for ODO 
and DMI, time windows for fault injection are in-
cluded and the faults are injected randomly. On the 
other hand, for BTM, LTM and TIU faults are inject-















Figure 4 – Configuration and running software execution order for saboteur
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3) Identify the worst faults according to their effect in 
the reference journey.
4) Apply the worst faults to other test journeys.
The file used as reference journey was chosen 
because it contains all types of messages (ODO, TIU, 
DMI, LTM and BTM). On the other hand, the journeys 
selected to test the worst faults were created to test 
particular situations on the train. Table 4 shows the 
twelve journeys and the element under test.
To verify the effect of the saboteurs, a simulation 
without faults is performed and the JRU file is saved, 
so it is possible to compare this file with the JRUs with 
faults. Another way to see the effect of the saboteurs 
is in the DMI; if any change occurs it should be shown 
in the DMI.
7. RESULTS
This section shows the analysis and the results of 
the tests made following the strategy proposed in the 
previous chapter. First, the results obtained using a 
reference journey are analysed with the aim of identi-
fying the worst cases based on the result of the ETCS 
OBU behaviour. Then, the results of the worst cases 
injected to other scenarios are presented. 
7.1 Reference journey results
Table 5 shows all the obtained results when the 
faults are applied to the reference journey.
With the results obtained so far (see Table 5) it can 
be concluded that the DMI faults only have effect in 
the driver's screen, i.e. the JRU does not detect the 
changes made by the saboteur, because the faults in-
jected directly to the DMI do not have any effects in 
the OBU. Moreover, in TIU faults some changes in the 
JRU file are observed, but this does not affect the OBU. 
There are two kinds of TIU messages: the messages 
sent by the TIU that just informs about the status of 
some elements (brake, cab, etc.) and the messages 
sent by the EVC to change the status of the elements. 
The TIU saboteur alters the messages that inform 
about the status, and these produce changes in the 
JRU but they do not have any effect on the system.
On the other hand, in the odometer faults it can 
be observed that if speed is changed and exceeds the 
limit the train activates the emergency brake. Thus, 
this fault significantly affects the simulated journey. 
The same behaviour occurs with balise or Euroloop 
faults when they are applied to elements that contain 
movement authority information. If one of these el-
ements is not detected the emergency brake is also 
activated.
As mentioned in Section 6 to check the effects 
of the faults the JRU and the DMI are used. Figure 5 
shows the DMI when the fault ODO-2 is injected, and 
the emergency brake is activated [28].
Figure 5 – DMI when the fault ODO-2 is injected
Figure 6a shows the JRU file of the reference jour-
ney in a normal operation. On the other hand, Figure 6b 
shows the JRU file in the same point, but fault BTM-H1 
is injected. As it can be observed the emergency brake 
is activated.
a) JRU file in a simulation without faults         b) JRU file when the fault BTM-H1 is injected
Figure 6 – JRU files of the reference journey simulation
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Table 4 – List of the journeys to test the worst cases
Journey name Element under test Annotations
Scenario 1 Trip at Movement Authority (MA) end
Scenario 2 Level Transition Level 0 to Level 1
Scenario 3 Level Transition Level 1 to Level 0
Scenario 4 Mode Transition due to Mode Profile 1 Full Supervision (FS) to On Sight
Scenario 5 Mode Transition due to Mode Profile 2 FS to Shunting (SH)
Scenario 6 Trip because missing balise in linked
Scenario 7 Mode Transition due to MA Staff Responsible (SR) to FS
Scenario 8 Level Transition 2 Level 1/Level 0 to Level 2
Scenario 9 Level Transition 3 Level 2 to Level 1/Level 0
Scenario 10 Trip because MA not received
Scenario 11 Stop if in Staff responsible
Scenario 12 Stop if in SH
Table 5 – Results obtained in the reference journey
Event Id Results obtained
MMI-1a Two extra messages can be observed in DMI: the request to full supervision and the driver’s answer
MMI-1b Two extra messages can be observed in DMI: the non-leading request and the driver’s answer
MMI-1c Two extra messages can be observed in DMI: the override request and the driver’s answer
MMI-1d Two extra messages can be observed in DMI: the acknowledgment of level transition and the driver’s answer
MMI-1e Two extra messages can be observed in DMI: the acknowledgment of train trip and the driver’s answer
MMI-1f Two extra messages can be observed in DMI: the request of track ahead free and the driver’s answer
MMI-2a A different speed is shown in the DMI
MMI-2b An extra ETCS mode messages is observed
MMI-3 Two extra messages can be observed in DMI: the train data entry request and the driver’s answer
MMI-4 The information shown in the DMI is delayed
ODO-1 No changes were observed
ODO-2 The emergency brake is activated
ODO-3 No changes were observed
ODO-4 No changes were observed
TI-1 No changes were observed
TI-2 The JRU file with the injected faults contains just two brake events compared with the six events shown in the JRU without faults.
TI-3 An extra sleeping request message is observed in the JRU
TI-4 The JRU file with the injected faults contains just two brake events compared with the six events shown in the JRU without faults
TI-5 No changes were observed
TI-6a A message of cab status not active is added to the JRU
TI-6b A message of cab status not active is added to the JRU
BTM-H1 If the deleted balise contains MA information, the emergency brake is activated.Otherwise no changes were observed
BTM-H4 If the edited balise contains MA information, the emergency brake is activated. Otherwise no changes were observed
BTM-H7 No changes were observed
BTM-H8 If the balise contains MA information, the emergency brake is activated. Otherwise no changes were ob-served
BTM-H9 No changes were observed
LTM-H4 If the deleted Euroloop contains MA information, the emergency brake is activated. Otherwise no changes were observed
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The tests made show that the worst effect on the 
OBU is when the faults cause the activation of the 
emergency brake, therefore, two faults were chosen as 
the worst cases: ODO-2, when the speed exceeds the 
limit the emergency brake is activated and BTM-H1, 
when the OBU expects a balise or Euroloop with move-
ment authority and it is not detected the emergency 
brake is also activated. 
7.2 Worst case scenarios
Finally, the worst faults are injected to the whole 
set of journeys (see Table 4). This means that 24 
tests are performed (12 with the ODO-2 and 12 with 
BTM-H1). Table 6 shows the results obtained when the 
fault BTM-H1 was injected to each journey.
Table 6 – Result obtained when the BTM-H1 is injected
Journey 
name Results obtained Comments
Scenario 1
If the balise contains 
MA information, the 
emergency brake is 
activated. Otherwise 
no changes are  
observed
Scenario 2 Same effect as  scenario 1
Scenario 3 Same effect as  scenario 1
Scenario 4 Same effect as  scenario 1
Scenario 5 Same effect as  scenario 1
Scenario 6
Due to the nature of 
the scenario, faults 
cannot be injected
The emergency 
brake is  
activated before 
the injection
Scenario 7 No changes were observed
The journey does 
not contain  
balises with MA
Scenario 8 Same effect as  scenario 1
Scenario 9 Same effect as  scenario 1
Scenario 10 Same effect as  scenario 1
Scenario 11 No changes were observed
The journey does 
not contain  
balises with MA
Scenario 12 No changes were observed
The journey does 
not contain  
balises with MA
On the other hand, when fault ODO-2 is injected 
the result obtained in all the journeys is the same: the 
emergency brake is activated. Figure 7 shows the JRU 
of the scenario 2 when the fault is injected, the emer-
gency brake is activated and it is possible to observe 
the speed of the train of 360 km/h (the speed in the 
JRU file is divided by 5, and that is why it is shown as 
72).
Figure 7 – JRU when the fault ODO-2 is injected in the 
scenario 2
The results obtained in the 12 scenarios are very 
similar to the reference journey, i.e., when an unex-
pected situation occurs during the journey, the OBU 
actives the emergency brake. Since this is a safety crit-
ical system and the safe mode is to apply the brakes, 
it can be stated that this is the correct behaviour of the 
system [29].
8. CONCLUSION
A new testing platform for the railway sector using 
saboteurs and a virtual laboratory was created. It al-
lows verifying the behaviour of the train OBU to unex-
pected faults in different interfaces (BTM, LTM, ODO, 
DMI and TIU). To check the consequences of faults, 
they were injected in distinct journeys and situations 
which proves the flexibility of the created platform.
The testing strategy allowed testing of all the events 
that can cause an ETCS core hazard, and the faults 
that have more impact on the OBU were detected. 
After that, the detected faults were analysed in multi-
ple journeys to verify the safety in all cases. 
The worst case is the activation of the emergen-
cy brake, which only occurs with BTM and ODO faults. 
However, it is important to note that all the BTM faults 
have the same effect on the OBU because if a balise 
with MA is changed or cannot be decoded for the EVC 
it is equal to delete it.
The tests made in all the journeys show that the 
emergency brake is activated in two situations: when 
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the train does not detect a balise with movement au-
thority information and when the odometer’s speed 
exceeds the limit. This is the correct behaviour, be-
cause in unforeseen situations the OBU goes to the 
safe mode. 
Therefore, it is possible to affirm that the platform 
presented allows testing of the train’s OBU against 
faults, which is a must in safety-critical systems. More-
over, the tests are performed in a virtual laboratory 
(simulation), reducing cost and time.
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PRUEBAS DE SEGURIDAD DE LA UNIDAD  
DE ABORDO ETCS: SABOTEADORES, ESTRATEGIA  
DE PRUEBAS Y RESULTADOS
RESUMEN
En el sistema Europeo de control de trenes es necesario 
verificar la tolerancia a fallos de los sistemas de a bordo, 
incluso si estos fallos son poco frecuentes. Los métodos 
tradicionales definidos y utilizados por los trenes Europeos 
no permiten comprobar esto, por lo que es necesario desarr-
ollar nuevos mecanismos de pruebas. Este trabajo presenta 
el diseño e implementación de un saboteador aplicado al 
sector ferroviario, el objetivo principal de dicho saboteador 
es la inyección de fallos en las interfaces de comunicación. 
Utilizando un laboratorio virtual es posible simular el 
recorrido de un tren para poner a prueba la unidad de a 
bordo.  Haciendo uso del laboratorio y de los saboteadores 
es posible analizar el comportamiento del tren ante fallos 
inesperados, y además se puede verificar si las decisiones 
tomadas por el tren son las adecuadas para garantizar el 
nivel de seguridad. Por lo tanto, este articulo muestra una 
estrategia de pruebas basada en múltiples recorridos de 
tren y aplicando fallo, finalmente se presenta el análisis de 
resultados.
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Saboteador; Inyección de fallos; Laboratorio virtual; ETCS; 
Unidad de a bordo; estrategia de pruebas;
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